(Photo: A couple of mountain goats that crossed our path on Quandary Peak.)

My research is primarily focused on the problem of moral uncertainty.  I defend the view that morally uncertain agents ought to be concerned with the expected moral value of their actions.  This means that sometimes they should avoid moral recklessness, refraining from acting in a way they think is probably morally best because of the moral peril attached to that action.  In my dissertation, which I successfully defended in May 2018, I refined this view and defend it against a number of objections.  One of those defenses, against an objection raised by Elizabeth Harman, was recently published in Utilitas.  In other work I argue that two other major objections to this view rest on a confused way of modelling decision-making under moral uncertainty.  

In addition to moral uncertainty, I have research interests in political philosophy and applied ethics, especially environmental ethics and bioethics.